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INSPIRING DEVELOPMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

By Seth Kaplan

Western development agencies are largely secular. Standard bearers of a rationalist and bureaucratic culture, such institutions see the job of promoting economic and political modernization as one that requires scientific objectivity, dispassionate analysis, and number crunching. Few agencies seriously contemplate the idea that religion—whether in the form of spirituality or of organized religion—could make a positive contribution to such decidedly earthly matters as economic development and state building.

Yet religion’s potential to spur development is enormous, especially in the world’s poorest, most fragile states. From the Congo to Pakistan, faith-based organizations (FBOs) are often the only locally organized groups working among the destitute, filling in for governments where they are too feeble to provide even basic schooling and health care. In recent years, some international development agencies have enlisted FBOs to deliver various services in impoverished communities. Such schemes, however, see FBOs merely as cogs in a distinctly Western, top-down approach to development. They ignore the potential of religion and indigenous institutions to play a greater role in repairing the societal fractures and government weaknesses that hold back struggling countries.

The Western development community views the concept of development too narrowly. Part of the problem is a misdiagnosis of the major causes of the dysfunction that plagues fragile states across Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Agencies execute initiatives as if economic reform, elections, and administrative training alone could fix these countries’ problems. Sociopolitical dynamics have been practically ignored. When it comes to development, building social cohesion, social capital, and the capacity for self-governance should be the starting point for any initiative—and few organizations are better equipped to reverse social atomization and catalyze local capacities for self-governance than FBOs.

How Religion Spurred Western Development

In Africa, the Middle East, and many parts of Asia and Latin America, religion and governance were closely interwined before the European imperialists arrived, and a similar pattern has reemerged since the Europeans departed. Today, religion continues to exert a powerful influence on how individuals and communities in the developing world interact with each other and with their governments. "For most people of the ‘South,’” concluded one Western scholar after working in the field for several years, "spirituality is integral to their understanding of the world and their place in it, and so it is central to the decisions that they make about their own and their communities’ development." Indeed, faith is such a key component of the social fabric in the developing world that "some languages do
not even have a word for ‘religion’; life is steeped in belief and belief is life itself.”

In the West, by contrast, the separation of church and state is generally considered to have been a milestone along the road to modernization and is still hailed as a cornerstone of the West’s prosperity and democracy. But even Westerners acknowledge that religion was instrumental in helping spur the economic and political revolution that enabled first Europe and then North America to enjoy global predominance. As Max Weber famously argued in the early 20th century, the “Protestant ethic” and “the spirit of capitalism” went hand in hand. Weber and subsequent sociologists identified at least five ways in which faith encouraged development.\(^3\)

First, certain types of Protestantism—notably, Calvinism—promoted capitalist development in Britain, Holland, Germany, and the United States because they indirectly reshaped social ethics and economic activities. Protestant teachings encouraged, among other things, planning, frugality, diligence, discipline, capital accumulation, risk taking, a commitment to one’s secular vocation, and the pursuit of new ideas such as the sciences and technology.

Second, the organizational structure of some denominations instilled attitudes and taught skills that encouraged economic and political modernization. For instance, some congregations encouraged widespread lay participation in the management of their affairs and debate among members, a style sharply at odds with existing norms in the wider society at that time. Some groups promoted greater egalitarianism, with the Quakers even instituting approximate equality between women and men within their congregations.\(^4\)

Third, the Protestant emphasis on reading the Bible encouraged literacy and promoted the rapid diffusion of printing press technology across much of Europe. The resulting increase in human capital (the stock of skills and knowledge able to produce economic value) significantly contributed to economic prosperity.\(^6\)

Fourth, Protestantism also played an important role in expanding trade and finance by how it built social capital, ensured the implementation of contracts, and expanded business networks. As Adam Smith noted, close-knit faith groups could enforce social norms; this encouraged repeated interactions among members, cooperation, and trust—all essential for expanding commerce and lending, especially in societies lacking state institutions able to guarantee contracts. Similarly, Jews historically enjoyed many advantages in businesses that depended on a delay between the delivery of a good and the payment for it—trade in small, portable, and valuable commodities such as diamonds, fine metals, and expensive dye-stuffs, and banking and money lending—because of how their religious communities were able to instill and enforce social discipline.\(^7\)

Fifth and last, Protestant “enthusiasm” helped “break down, delegitimate, and otherwise weaken the hold of authoritarian political and social structures.”\(^8\) As even David Hume argued, “enthusiasm [is] not less or rather more contrary to [priestly power], than sound reason and philosophy.”\(^9\) This type of religion inspired an intense morality among believers, who committed themselves to virtuous behavior and campaigned against corruption in public office, thereby encouraging citizens to hold their leaders to higher standards. In the Nordic countries, reformist churches operated more or less democratically from the 18th century onward, setting the stage for later social and democratic change.\(^10\)

This is not to say that Christianity did not also deter development (Catholicism’s dictates against the study of the sciences, for instance, surely held back many countries), nor to argue that other factors, such as the Enlightenment, were unimportant to Europe’s emergence from feudalism and obscurantism. However, at the
very least, religious belief significantly influenced the capacity of societies to develop, encouraging it in those places that developed first and discouraging it in areas that developed later.

How Religion Spurs Development Today

Today, a variety of religions and denominations in different developing countries are effecting similar changes to those wrought by the spread of Protestantism in early modern Europe.

In most African, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American states, religious belief shapes not only moral and ethical outlooks but also political opinions on subjects such as the legitimacy of leaders and governments. Some Brazilian Pentecostal and African charismatic churches, for example, are transforming many of the values, skills, and activities of their members by emphasizing the importance of acquiring wealth, encouraging congregants—especially women—to play a much greater role in their communities, and teaching leadership and management skills. “The initial impact of Evangelical conversion [in Latin America and other parts of the developing world] occurs … as a major mutation of culture: restoration of the family, the rejection of machismo, the adoption of economic and work disciplines and new priorities,” writes David Martin, a sociologist of religion. These churches create “an autonomous social space within which people may participate in the creation of a different kind of sub-society … those who count for little or nothing in the wider world find themselves addressed as persons able to display initiative and to be of consequence. … As these enclaves multiply, religious monopoly breaks down and pluralism develops.”

Whereas the government may barely exist outside a few main cities, faith networks (and traditional social groupings that have a strong religious component) may be deeply enmeshed in communities across a country, providing in some cases the most reliable form of security, justice, and support for the poor. These closely-knit religious groups are often the main catalyst for the formation of robust social networks, which are the main storehouse of social capital in countries where society is heavily fragmented and the state is too weak to govern effectively. The more cohesive groups, such as the Mouride brotherhood (a large Islamic Sufi order found mostly in Senegal and the Gambia) and the Sikhs in India, have been able to leverage their spiritual networks to foster entrepreneurship, trade, and wealth creation in ways their states cannot.

Throughout the developing world, FBOs have a tangible and profound impact on the everyday activities of people underserved by their governments. FBOs are essential providers of education, health, humanitarian relief, and microfinance to hundreds of millions of people, substituting for absent governments across large swathes of the developing world. They range from large Western-based, faith-based development organizations such as Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and Islamic Relief to the much smaller locally based organizations typically centered on churches, temples, or mosques; on madrasas, seminaries, and other religious schools; or on informal groups such as those teaching the Gospel or the Quran in the plainest of settings. Local religious organizations account for the bulk of organized group activity in many places, provide the primary means of relief for families in crises, and even play major roles in economic endeavors. The World Bank’s 2000 Voices of the Poor study confirmed that “in ratings of effectiveness in both urban and rural settings, religious organizations feature more prominently than any single type of state institution.”

The importance of these groups is especially palpable in the education and health sectors. They deliver, for example, half of all such services in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Bank. In some places, such as parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Pakistan, churches and mosques have effectively replaced the state as the primary supplier of public goods. One study concluded that “the only significant reductions in HIV prevalence that have been recorded [in Uganda] are in contexts where the faith community took on a leadership role.”
In fact, given the loss of confidence in formal government institutions and the dearth of professional opportunities available in stagnant, unstable environments, many talented local people see FBOs as one of the best outlets for their ambitions and energies, producing a noticeable shift of entrepreneurial skills from politics and business to religious entities. Groups such as Sri Lanka’s Buddhist Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement (Sarvodaya), Turkey’s Muslim Gülen movement, and Latin America’s Jesuit-based Fe y Alegría all play important roles helping societies develop.15

To be sure, religion can cause problems. It can inspire bloodshed (either by itself or in combination with other markers of identity), and it is a very effective recruiting sergeant for terrorism. The same characteristic that makes religious groups so useful in commerce—social cohesion—also makes them highly effective perpetrators of violence. Faith is also a major determinant of social exclusion in some countries, and thereby contributes to poverty, disempowerment, and conflict.

Some religious doctrines—such as those against usury and private enterprise, and those that deny the rights of women and members of lower castes—continue to be a major obstacle to economic and social progress in some parts of the world. And countries that actively discriminate against minority faiths, as in Saudi Arabia, or allow a religious hierarchy to monopolize the interpretation of political and economic laws, as in Iran, are similarly likely to hold back the establishment of the accountable institutions and block the creative thinking necessary for development.

All these obstacles to development, however, are overshadowed by religion’s potential to play an important role in promoting a gradual transformation of the political and economic landscape in the poorest parts of the world. Indeed, faith plays such an outsized role in the lives of people in such places that finding ways to take advantage of its values, organizations, and capacities to catalyze and transform how groups of people behave and cooperate is one of the few ways to change the dynamics of development in fractured, dysfunctional countries.

At Arm’s Length: FBOs and the Western Development Community

Western governments and Western-led multilateral institutions such as the World Bank have tried in recent years to better engage faith groups. James Wolfensohn, in particular, tried to increase cooperation with FBOs during his term as president of the World Bank, but resistance within the institution eventually limited the impact of his work to the creation of a small internal unit offering policy advice. European government agencies, such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have launched research projects and conducted policy reviews on religion’s role in development, but simultaneously have felt obliged to “specifically point out” that such programs “should not be taken to imply that they have themselves abandoned their secular nature and outlook,” for fear of offending their citizens or their employees.16 The Bush administration had no such qualms and tried to boost support for and cooperation with FBOs, but even in that case cultural blinders and political realities dictated that the great majority of contracts went to US-based Christian bodies (just two Muslim groups received any grants or contracts between 2001 and 2005).17

Many religious groups feel excluded from aid programs. Muslim organizations, for example, “are not part of major humanitarian reform efforts; they often see themselves pushed aside. … When Western groups come to the Muslim world, they try to work only with secular organizations, not with grassroots religious organizations that are well-represented in the local communities.” The broad secular bias has serious practical implications for programs. For instance, “women seeking international help are completely left out unless they are secular.”18

“Typically, secular and governmental donors’ willingness to contribute varies inversely with an organization’s overtly religious behavior,” concluded a study published by Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs.19 Similarly, a 2004 DFID-funded report concluded that the
organization’s “quasi-secular model of development and its focus on partnership with mainstream Christian development organizations are increasingly untenable in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 worlds.”

Relationships between Western governments, aid agencies, multilateral organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), on the one hand, and, on the other, the great majority of local faith groups—especially those working in the Islamic, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and African religious traditions—remain severely limited, with cooperation generally restricted to a very narrow set of secular activities. There has been almost no attempt to engage faith groups in developing countries on their own terms or any attempt to take advantage of the unique capacities that these groups bring to the table.

Faith Networks: Catalysts for Development

Development agencies cannot make states function properly from the outside. International assistance may be necessary but it is never sufficient to establish governments that are legitimate and sustainable and that can provide the positive societal incentives necessary to jumpstart the development process. Instead, communities need to look for ways to take advantage of their own resources, capacities, and institutions if they are ever to advance.

While government is often weak in these countries, just as often religion is strong: it shapes values and develops skills, it is the primary means of association and of conflict management, and it offers a way to build social capital and to hold community leaders more accountable. As Gerrie ter Haar and Stephen Ellis explain:

In many of Africa’s poorest countries, effective, centralized bureaucracies hardly exist. … In countries of this type, power is, literally, dis-integrated. It becomes a matter of necessity rather than choice to consider how development could be enhanced by using the resources in society at large. Many of the communities or social networks that carry the burden of development have a religious form or convey religious ideas in some sense.”

In the Middle East, notes Bernard Lewis, “religion, or more precisely membership of a religious community, is the ultimate determinant of identity … the focus of loyalty and, not less important, the source of authority.” Islamic organizations have in many cases—and certainly in all the poorest communities—such legitimacy and constituency that it would be hard to effect substantial change without their participation. Indeed, various studies and symposia have concluded that there is enormous potential “in more purposeful efforts to associate development issues, practices, and organizations with Muslim traditions and actors.”

Enhancing FBOs and Other Homegrown Social Networks

The international community’s development agenda focuses far too much on top-down state building, which overemphasizes the role of Western development agencies, foreign NGOs, and national government ministries in capital cities often geographically and culturally remote from most of the population. Building states from the bottom-up around local groups would likely produce a much more sustainable process, as it would enmesh the state in the surrounding society and make the state dependent on the capacities and loyalties of local peoples.

If Western development agencies opted to emphasize programs that help societies reform from within, those agencies would quickly discover the merits of investing more of their resources in faith groups (and other indigenous networks). For instance, training the spiritual and administrative leaders of FBOs—from ministers and imams to school principals and the heads of waqf foundations—on management, economics, education, and social welfare would help their organizations take on larger projects, expand their services, and improve their operations. Similarly, assisting well-established groups in introducing (in partnership, perhaps, with NGOs or private companies) savings and loans schemes,
sanitation and garbage-collection systems, and housing development cooperatives would speed the spread of such programs throughout the developing world. Helping faith networks provide services such as microlending and trade facilitation—services that require cohesive groups able to ensure member compliance with commitments—would open new opportunities for members to advance themselves. Measures that fostered greater cohesion—by improving internal governance, by expanding services, by helping codify norms and discipline regimes, and by creating stronger ties between members—would foster more “spiritual capital” (social capital created through religion), an invaluable resource in the low-trust environment common in fragile states.\(^{24}\)

Greater financial and material aid from the international community would enable mosques, churches, and temples to expand the numbers of poor children who benefit from the schooling they provide. The consequent boost in levels of literacy would, in turn, enable the poor to participate more fully in social, political, and economic life; give developing economies a better chance of meeting the challenges of globalization; and improve many other development indicators. An expansion of faith-based education might be a mixed blessing in parts of the Muslim world, where local madrasas play a key role in delivering education but have been accused of spreading political fundamentalism. Since 9/11, many groups have encouraged madrasas to renounce extremism and introduce new subjects, including secular subjects, into their curricula. For instance, the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD), based in Washington, DC, has worked with leaders of Pakistani madrasas to promote peace and tolerance.\(^{25}\) Such efforts should be expanded.

Religious networks also offer unique ways to enhance government accountability and performance. These networks shape values and behaviors—and could be urged to do more to persuade bureaucrats and businessmen to eschew corruption. A partnership of the major networks within a city or region could constitute a powerful lobby for bottom-up reform of state institutions and for greater accountability of officials. Such a partnership could gradually be extended to encompass other stakeholders with similar interests in government reform (such as companies, tribal chiefs, and non-religious NGOs).

Reorienting Western Development Organizations

In order to take advantage of the human resources embedded in religious networks, Western development organizations, donors, multilateral organizations, and NGOs must seek a closer—and more evenhanded—partnership with local communities and the faith groups that play such prominent roles within those communities. This will require major changes in how these organizations operate. Besides reconsidering how development actually occurs—and how this might affect their programs—they will also have to reevaluate “the secular gospel underpinning the development enterprise,”\(^{26}\) and begin “taking seriously people’s world-views and considering their potential for the development process as a whole.”\(^{27}\) Western organizations that treat religion and development as separate and even incompatible phenomena not only undermine their ability to be effective but also risk offending and alienating the people of the communities they wish to serve. This danger is especially acute in non-Christian environments, where local populations tend to equate “Western” with “Christian” and thus will regard any denial of the importance of their religion as a Christian slur.

International development organizations will also have to stop emphasizing the amount of aid they disburse and focus instead on ensuring that the financing they provide complements and reinforces local capacities and institutions rather than undermining or warping local arrangements. While such organizations may gain prestige from the size of their budgets, community building based on a large number of small organizations—and most of the FBOs that serve the poor are small—requires a delicate approach consisting of modest, carefully targeted investments that reinforce capacities without undermining internal coherence and
accountability. Understanding the special needs of—and crafting the right strategy to partner with—the large number of small organizations in underdeveloped areas may even require the creation of a new, intermediary organization to bridge the large gulf between the large donors and multinational NGOs and the many small grassroots entities that need support.28

Of course, any undertaking that engages religion needs to be careful on a number of fronts. In particular, any activity that smacks of favoring one faith or denomination over another risks exacerbating, rather than healing, divisions. Assistance needs to be distributed in an evenhanded fashion, so that no religious community feels itself excluded from international largesse. The provision of assistance must also be handled very carefully when dealing with any organization that proselytizes, especially in a sectarian environment. The goal should be to ensure that aid is not used in any way to promote a specific religious or political viewpoint, and that where it is used to fund the delivery of services, those services are available without discrimination to everyone in a given area.

However, proselytizing is an integral part of most religions—especially among the world’s largest faiths, Christianity and Islam—and avoiding such groups will prove impossible in some cases. Indeed, given that missionary organizations are especially active among the most deprived sectors of society, and often have a closer relationship with them (living modestly and sharing the same deprivations) than do other NGOs, development agencies should not want to steer absolutely clear of proselytizers. Taking full advantage of religious networks and FBOs to promote development will require partnerships with a much broader set of organizations. A more nuanced and flexible approach should be formulated that balances the need to ensure equal access to services with the need to expand the range of organizations that agencies engage.

A Proposal for a New Organization

While government agencies, multilateral agencies, and secular NGOs can enhance their ability to promote development by working with FBOs, they are unlikely to overcome all of their hesitancy about working with religious bodies. That problem would be mitigated if an organization was created by and for the FBOs themselves. Such an organization could pool the knowledge, experience, and skills of numerous FBOs from different faiths. Unlike most FBOs, this organization would not concentrate on delivering services, and unlike existing interfaith bodies such as the World Parliament of the Religions, Religions for Peace (WCRP), and United Religions Initiative (URI), it would not focus on conflict resolution. Instead, with the financial and material support of major foundations, development agencies, and leading religious organizations from all creeds and from both the rich and the poor worlds, this new organization could explore a broader agenda for using religion to catalyze development in fragile states.

To begin, the new organization could launch a series of ambitious research programs on all facets of the relationship between religion and development. Although some universities have recently begun to explore this field (see below), the traditional reluctance among economists and other academics to analyze faith’s impact has only reinforced the tendency among development professionals to ignore religious belief and the role of FBOs in their own work.29 As one DFID-funded report explained, there has been “widespread neglect of the role of religion in both mainstream academic analysis of people’s lives and social relationships and in development theories and practice.”30 As a result, few aid specialists are familiar with the many faith networks that dominate the landscape of the poor—from Brazil’s favelas to Pakistan’s tribal areas—and thus do not incorporate such networks into their studies and plans.

The new organization’s research programs would do more than catalog information. They would seek to understand how faith networks function, how they influence the values of believers, how they are led, how they are funded, how effective their services are, and how well they are able to mobilize and discipline their members. Researching how religious values and relationships affect attitudes toward business and
modernization would help development specialists learn how to better engage local populations—and how to do so without unnecessarily and unwittingly undermining their traditional beliefs and norms. Discovering how the groups within a particular country or region relate to each other and to the government would create a clearer picture of their capacity to work together to improve governance and enhance social cohesion. Studying local social structures and identities, and the role of religion in influencing these, could generate ideas for bridging the deep divides that scar these societies. More specific studies could focus on, say, faith-based patterns of poverty and social exclusion, lessons learned by donors from their past engagement with faith groups, and the process by which religious organizations build social capital. The resulting databases, case studies, historical analyses, and interfaith comparisons would offer a rich assortment of information to help the wider development community and governments better engage these groups.

But this organization should aim to do more than just conduct research. It should also seek to fill an important gap in the development field by providing training, guidance, and support to faith networks in poor countries, both directly and in partnership with aid agencies and Western FBOs, such as Saddleback Church, which has developed and trained its own international network of pastors in recent years. And by working directly with Muslim, Hindu, and other religious philanthropists and FBOs, the new body would be well placed to encourage more private resources be directed toward development.

To some extent, the research arm of this new organization would complement the promising work now being undertaken in a handful of institutions. The University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom, for example, is in the middle of a five-year research program on religions and development funded by DFID.31 Georgetown University has taken over much of the work originally performed under the auspices of the World Bank to establish a program on religion and global development.32 The Institute of Social Studies in The Hague has set up a Knowledge Centre on Religion and Development.33 Harvard University and Johns Hopkins University also have been active in this area. But with the possible exception of the Birmingham program, none of these projects is attempting to systematically analyze all the issues raised in this paper related to development and religion. Most have only a handful of researchers. And their output is limited to papers, conferences, and catalogs of activities, which reach only small audiences. In short, there is as yet no agency proactively conducting research across all faiths with the intention of seeking to turn that knowledge into programs that can reach the great majority of religious groups and leaders around the world.

Conclusion
How might this gap be filled? What would it take to launch the kind of organization that can pool the intellectual capacities of FBOs and explore a broad agenda for catalyzing development? An initial step in this direction would require considerable commitment but only modest resources. Indeed, just one leader might be able to accomplish much if blessed with the threefold ability to develop a coherent vision of such an organization, to inspire individuals to embrace that vision, and to cajole institutions to fund its realization. As a first step, this person could seek to persuade a handful of the major religious organizations operating in the developing world—such as Caritas Internationalis, World Vision, the Aga Khan Foundation, Sarvodaya, and the Gülen movement—to form a partnership to establish a new organization around a few research and training programs. Each of the founding partners might play a different role—one might provide funds, for instance, while another offers intellectual advice—to support the work of the organization’s staff and leadership. Slowly but systematically, the organization could broaden its agenda, expand its team of researchers and trainers, and invite other FBOs to participate. Similarly, the number of countries and denominations served and the types of assistance offered to FBOs in developing countries could
gradually be expanded. Within a few years, this new organization might begin to have a major impact not only on the capacities and ambitions of faith groups engaged in promoting development but also on how development is perceived and approached.

Such change in perceptions might well extend even to secular-minded Western development agencies, which are well aware that their past efforts at repairing fragile states have yielded few positive results. For instance, the World Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group, which reports on the organization’s activities to its board of directors, concluded that “past international engagement with [fragile states] has failed to yield significant improvements, and donors and others continue to struggle with how best to assist [them].”34

There is thus a potentially receptive audience for any organization that can demonstrate an effective method of helping fragile states. As this article has argued, Western blueprints for development are only partially effective because development is not primarily a top-down process but rather is fundamentally an organic, bottom-up process driven by local capacities and social relationships. International action should first and foremost facilitate these local processes, leverage local capacities and complement local actions so that local citizens can create governance systems appropriate to their histories, values, and societies. In fragile states, the most effective institutions and most potent capacities are often to be found not within formal state structures but within non-state groups, organizations, and networks. And, in many cases, the most important of these are religious in nature.

If the new, FBO-funded organization could demonstrate this, it might make believers out of even the most secular of development professionals.

2. de Jong and others, Religion and Development Policy, 8.
3. Gerrie ter Haar and Stephen Ellis divide religious resources into four major categories—ideas, practices, organization, and experiences—all of which can “produce knowledge that, in principle, could be beneficial to a community for development purposes.” See ter Haar and Ellis, “The Role of Religion in Development,” 356.
5. “Autonomous social spaces” is a phrase generally attributed to David Martin, who uses it often in his writings on evangelical Christians. I find it equally useful in a historical context. See Martin, Tongues of Fire.
12. Narayan et al., Voices of the Poor, 222.
17. Stockman et al., “Bush Brings Faith to Foreign Aid.”
18. Georgetown University Center for International and Regional Studies, “Global Development and Faith-Inspired Organizations.”
20. Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales Swansea and the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Wales Lampeter, A Leap of Faith?
22. Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, 15, 22.
24. For more on spiritual capital, see, among others, Berger and Hefner, “Spiritual Capital in Comparative Perspective.”
25. See United States Institute of Peace, “Promoting Peace and Tolerance through Madrasa Reform.”
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27. ter Haar and Ellis, “The Role of Religion in Development,” 353.
29. “Development economics remains largely silent on the role of religion, largely maintaining a traditional approach of assuming religion away as part of ‘society’ or ‘culture.’ Jackson and Fleischer, “Religion and Economics,” 23. Although there has been “a vigorous interest in political science in examining the relationship between politics and religion … very little of the current output is focused on developing countries.” Singh et al., “Political Science, Religion, and Development,” 1.
32. See http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/programs/127 (accessed May 1, 2009).
33. See http://www.iss.nl/ (accessed May 1, 2009).
34. World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Engaging with Fragile States, ix.

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